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Abstract: For over 25 years, school choice advocates have argued that market competition drives 
educational organizations to become more differentiated and technically-oriented. However, empirical 
research has only partially supported this view, observing such outcomes only under certain conditions. 
To better understand the contingent nature of market effects within education, we draw on sociological 
and organizational theories that emphasize the ‘embeddedness’ of economic behavior. We test this idea 
using data from all private schools in Toronto, Canada, a strategic setting that approximates a ‘pure’ 
market by being mostly free of public governance. We find that, net of factors like school size and age, 
market segment is associated with the presence of a variety of organizational features. In conclusion, 
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we ponder ways that institutional norms and community ties not only buffer schools from market 
forces, but also, infuse consumer preferences. 
Keywords: private schools; economic sociology; markets; Toronto 
 
¿La competencia abierta o coexistencia balcanizada? Los efectos de los segmentos 
de mercado en las escuelas privadas de Toronto 
Resumen: Durante más de 25 años, defensores de la opción escolar han argumentado que 
la competencia del mercado impulsa a las organizaciones educativas a ser más diferenciadas 
y técnicamente orientadas. Sin embargo, la investigación empírica sólo ha apoyado 
parcialmente esta opinión, observando tales resultados sólo bajo ciertas condiciones. Para 
entender mejor la naturaleza contingente de los efectos del mercado dentro de la educación, 
nos basamos en teorías sociológicas y organizacionales que enfatizan la “embeddedness” del 
comportamiento económico. Probamos esta idea usando datos de todas las escuelas 
privadas en Toronto, Canadá, un escenario estratégico que se aproxima a un mercado 
“puro” por estar en su mayoría libre de gobierno público. Encontramos que, aparte de 
factores como el tamaño de la escuela y la edad, el segmento de mercado se asocia con la 
presencia de una variedad de características organizacionales. En conclusión, reflexionamos 
sobre cómo las normas institucionales y los lazos comunitarios no sólo protegen a las 
escuelas de las fuerzas del mercado, sino también infunden las preferencias de los 
consumidores. 
Palabras-clave: escuelas privadas; sociología económica; mercados; Toronto 
 
Concorrência aberta ou coexistência balcanizada? Os efeitos dos segmentos de 
mercado nas escolas particulares de Toronto  
Resumo: Durante más de 25 años, defensores de la opción escolar han argumentado que la 
competencia del mercado impulsa a las organizaciones educativas a ser más diferenciadas y 
técnicamente orientadas. Sin embargo, la investigación empírica sólo ha apoyado 
parcialmente esta opinión, observando tales resultados sólo bajo ciertas condiciones. Para 
entender mejor la naturaleza contingente de los efectos del mercado dentro de la educación, 
nos basamos en teorías sociológicas y organizacionales que enfatizan la “embeddedness” del 
comportamiento económico. Probamos esta idea usando datos de todas las escuelas 
privadas en Toronto, Canadá, un escenario estratégico que se aproxima a un mercado 
“puro” por estar en su mayoría libre de gobierno público. Encontramos que, aparte de 
factores como el tamaño de la escuela y la edad, el segmento de mercado se asocia con la 
presencia de una variedad de características organizacionales. En conclusión, reflexionamos 
sobre cómo las normas institucionales y los lazos comunitarios no sólo protegen a las 
escuelas de las fuerzas del mercado, sino también infunden las preferencias de los 
consumidores. 
Palavras-chave: escolas particulares; sociología económica; mercados; Toronto 
Introduction: Market Theory on the Organization of Schools 
Since the early 1990s, supporters of school choice have made bold claims about the beneficial 
effects of markets on educational organizations.1 Generalizing from American Catholic schools, 
proclaimed by scholars throughout the 1980s to be more efficient (e.g., having lower costs) and 
                                                 
1 Our review focuses on the impact of choice on school organization, rather than on the voluminous literature 
on the effects of choice on student performance. For a review of the latter topic, see Berends (2015).  
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effective (e.g. generating high test scores) than public counterparts (see Coleman, Hoffer & Kilgore, 
1982; Davies & Pizarro Milian, 2013), Chubb and Moe (1990) and others (see Lieberman, 1989, 1993) 
articulated a set of ideas that would become known as ‘Market Theory.’ This perspective rested on 
the assumption that market environments indiscriminately rewarded ‘success’ and ‘punished’ failure, 
selecting out the weakest competitors within a field, and effectively transforming entire organizational 
populations (see also Smith, 1994, p. 475; Schneider, Teske, & Marschall, 2000, p. 35). Key to such 
setup was the extension of unfettered choice to parents (e.g. “open enrollment programs), allowing 
them to select from private and public options across “extensive geographical areas,” and effectively 
placing each school in direct “competition with every other school for students” (West, 1997, p. 86, 
87). Alas, it entailed the erection of a ‘pure’ market for education, akin to those that had previously 
revolutionized conventional industries (Friedman, 1997). Forcing schools to compete for student-
derived revenue would blow a “fresh breeze of innovation” into the education system, forcing the 
enactment of a series of adaptations in school procedures and structures (Metz, 2003, p. 1; also see 
Coulson, 1994, 1996, 1999; Friedman, 1962). Market competition would compel schools to become 
more technically-oriented, driving them to i) cut costs, by dropping wasteful practices, ii) become 
more performance-driven, focused primarily on improving quantitative metrics, like standardized test 
scores, and iii) differentiate their curricula and pedagogy to align with consumer demands. These 
adaptations, devised to attract clients, would have the effect of toppling the ‘one size fits all’ model 
within the public school system (see Tyack & Cuban, 1995). In doing so, market schemes were hailed 
as having the potential to reverse strong ‘isomorphic’ processes, or convergence on ‘taken-for-
granted’ ways of organizing, within the field of education (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978).  
Throughout their relatively short existence, choice reforms have remained a divisive and 
controversial subject within public discourse (Henig, 2008). Supporters have lauded the 
rationalization of educational processes at the hands of the market. Meanwhile, detractors have 
decried the penetration of neoliberal logics into the sacrosanct realm of education, lamenting that the 
‘civic’ functions of education are undermined by competition-oriented reforms (Olssen, 2002). 
Though advancing clearly contradictory assessments of choice reforms and their supposed 
consequences, both camps perceive neoliberal inspired market reforms to be fundamentally 
reconfiguring educational organizations, and both see choice schemes as eroding traditions and 
practices within the field of education. We posit, however, that these supposed effects have not been 
adequately mapped empirically. When Market Theory was first voiced in the early 1990s, most choice 
schemes were still in their infancy, and thus had generated little data with which to map market 
effects. Though some scholars compared Catholic and public schools, they primarily attributed 
differences in the former to their linked religious communities rather than markets (see Coleman, 
Hoffer & Kilgore, 1982). We posit that Market Theory is best tested with data on a range of schools 
of choice, both religious and non-religious, since this allows one to observe the effects of specific 
market segments and their communities. Such tests have become feasible in recent years as choice 
initiatives have gained traction throughout the United States, and have even perforated some 
Canadian provinces (Bossetti & Gereluk, 2016). Numerous scholars have become interested in 
different kinds of private schools and other schools of choice, creating a specialist literature on 
educational markets (see Berends, 2015; Davies & Quirke, 2007; Lubienski, 2003; Lubienski & Lee, 
2016). Such work has found that competition does not uniformly shape school structures and 
practices, but does so only under specific conditions. Indeed, choice schools have been found to 
remain isomorphic with their traditional public counterparts in fundamental ways. As such, the 
supposedly ‘radical’ effects of markets on educational organizations, believed to be occurring by both 
choice advocates and critics, remain largely unsubstantiated. 
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In light of such emerging literature, we seek to empirically and theoretically understand: How 
are market forces reconfiguring educational organizations? What accounts for the seemingly 
contingent nature of market effects found across the literature?  Do market segments, and their 
corresponding communities and norms, mediate the supposed effects of market pressures on 
educational organizations? We explore these questions empirically by identifying four market 
segments within the Toronto private school (TPS) sector – Elite, Religious, ‘New’ and International – 
and testing whether those segments are independent predictors of a host of school traits and actions, 
net of standard control variables. In particular, we examine differences in population stability (e.g. 
births/deaths/sanctioning), institutional orientation (e.g. geographical location, physical facility and 
curriculum type), and status orientations (e.g. tuition costs, affluence of location, advertising of 
alumni in prestigious schools). Drawing on theorizing from the fields of Organizational and 
Economic Sociology (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Meyer & Rowan, 2006), we hypothesize 
that schools across segments will vary considerably, given that each are embedded within unique 
communities. This exposes them to different ‘bundles’ of institutionalized norms, such as associating 
schooling with children’s holistic development, or the linking of conventional school characteristics 
to prestige, which differentially buffer schools from market pressures. Moreover, we theorize that such 
norms can be perceived as differentially infusing consumer demand across communities, and thus, 
contributing to the balkanization of educational markets. To the extent that conventional school 
forms are associated with prestige, that unconventional forms are distrusted, or that cost-cutting is 
associated with ‘cheapness,’ we argue that communal norms serve as ‘filters’ through which 
consumers evaluate schools, and thus, serve as parameters for inter-school competition.  
 
Robust Findings from Empirical Studies 
 
Empirical studies of choice schools suggest several robust patterns that provide only mixed 
support for Market Theory. First, boosted competition appears to trigger only a limited amount of 
differentiation and niche-seeking among schools. While some groupings of private and public schools 
do appear to have an abundance of curricular specialties (Gaztambide-Fernandez, Nicholls & Arraiz-
Matute 2016), others do not (e.g., Davies & Quirke, 2007; Hassel, 1998, 1999; Price, 1999). When 
innovation does occur among some schools of choice, it seems to be through peripheral ‘add-ons’ 
rather than ‘core’ changes to traditional structures or classroom practices (Plank & Sykes, 1999). As 
Adnett & Davies (1999) note, competition tends to drive choice schools to place an “emphasis upon 
promotional and image enhancing changes, rather than substantive changes in school’s teaching and 
curriculum” (p. 229). As such, even in the face of increased competition, isomorphism remains across 
many dimensions of school organization (Berends & Zottola, 2009; Horn & Miron, 2000; Lubienski, 
Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Lubienski & Lee, 2016; Preston, Goldring, Berends, & Cannata, 2011).  
Second, marketized environments appear to push schools to become more technically-
oriented in only certain respects. For instance, when faced with revenue shortfalls, private schools will 
engage in drastic cuts, compromising educational conventions such as libraries, gyms, and certified 
teachers (Quirke, 2009, 2013). But, when not facing dire conditions, schools of choice, and even 
private tutoring businesses, tend to retain many ‘institutional’ features that market advocates label as 
inefficient (Aurini, 2015). In fact, it would be fair to say that a performance orientation among 
schools is more effectively encouraged through policymaking than markets. Government-led 
accountability regimes, such as the USA’s No Child Left Behind Act, have driven schools of choice 
(and public schools) to focus on standardized test scores. Absent of such coercive stimulus, schools’ 
behavior remains largely unaffected. Established private schools, for instance, largely eschew 
standardized testing (Davies & Quirke, 2007). Market forces, when left on their own, appear to 
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channel competition not towards performance orientation, but instead, to practices that are oriented 
towards customer service, such as small classes, advertising, outreach to parents, and so on (Quirke, 
2009, 2013). 
Third, schools of choice that are relatively established and financially secure tend to embrace 
very ‘institutional’ aspects of education, such as generalist curricula and elaborate physical plants 
(Gauri, 1998; Lubienski, 2001, 2003). This behavior conforms to broader patterns found across a 
variety of organizational fields whereby mid-status actors strive to emulate elite peers in order to 
enhance their own status (Han, 1994; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001, 2013). Many schools, even in 
highly marketized environments, seek organizational forms that are associated with status, prestige 
and exclusivity, rather than student performance per se.  
Finally, ‘expressive’ criteria appear to drive many popular forms of choice, such as religious 
schools, schools of the arts, and homeschooling. These choices are popular not necessarily for their 
technical attributes (e.g., low cost, academic benefits), but for their connection to certain non-
economic values. Religious schools, for instance, are primarily valued by clients for their faith 
orientation (Zine, 2006, 2008), though they take very pragmatic approaches to their organization, 
economizing when needed. Homeschooling similarly appeals to parents with either religious or 
‘alternative’ cultural values (Aurini & Davies, 2005; Davies & Aurini, 2003; Stevens, 2001). Public 
schools of the arts are also attracting increasing numbers of clients who hold widely varying notions 
of the value and meaning of art (Gaztambide-Fernandez et al., 2015). 
 
Rationale for this Study 
 
Like others (Berends, 2015), we read this literature as suggesting that school markets do not 
uniformly trigger the effects proposed by choice advocates, such as increased differentiation and 
technical orientations, but do so only under certain conditions. In light of such findings, we seek to 
inquire: Why are market effects seemingly contingent, and under which conditions are they strong or 
weak? Why might market forces transform only some elements of school organizations, only under 
certain conditions, and allow schools to remain otherwise unaffected? In this paper, we seek to 
answer these questions empirically and theoretically. Empirically, we examine all school organizations 
in a strategic setting: the City of Toronto’s private school (TPS) sector. Our setting provides an 
important test of Market Theory in several ways. First, its broader jurisdiction is very dynamic: the 
number of private schools in the province of Ontario is continually growing, having doubled from 
about 500 to just over 1000 over the past 25 years (Davies & Pizarro Milian, 2015). This dynamism 
has created a varied degree of stability within the private school population: some schools are very 
established and stable, while others are newer, embroiled in competition, and teeter on the brink of 
extinction. Second, it hosts a wide variety of school types, from generalist to specialist, from non-
profit to for-profit, from tuition-expensive to relatively cheap. Third, Toronto private schools are 
freer from public governance than are U.S. charter schools, magnet schools and voucher-receiving 
schools, whose funding depends more readily on meeting criteria set out in charter agreements and 
related legislation. The TPS does fall short of one ideal held by choice advocates: they do not receive 
public subsidies and are thus unaffordable to the city’s poorest families. Yet, many of these schools, 
particularly religious ones, instead receive subsidies from community organizations, and can charge 
relatively low tuition fees that are affordable to large swaths of the city’s families. In sum, TPS 
provides a dynamic and varied school marketplace. 
Theoretically, we seek to move beyond Market Theory by incorporating ideas that are attuned 
to the broader range of social influences on school organizations. Market Theory assumes that 
educational conventions persist only as market ‘imperfections,’ remnants of older, pre-market 
governance that will eventually wither away if exposed to competition (Merrifield, 2001). Yet, studies 
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show that despite a quarter century of marketization, school organizations, even in competitive 
settings, continue to bear the imprint of longstanding traditions. Many forms of isomorphism, ‘loose 
coupling’2 and non-technical orientations thrive even under the pressures of market competition. To 
better theorize these robust empirical patterns, we incorporate three sets of ideas. First, we draw on 
contemporary New Institutionalism (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 2006) to understand the persistence of 
institutional norms in private education. Second, we draw on Economic Sociology (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1985) to highlight the social underpinnings of market relations in local networks and 
communities. Third, we hypothesize how combinations of institutional norms and communities 
create market segments in private education. 
 
Theory I: Persisting Institutional Norms in the Face of Market Forces 
 
New Institutionalism emerged in the 1970s to argue that schools, and organizations more 
broadly, are subject to sweeping ‘isomorphic’ pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978). Through 
coercive, mimetic and normative channels, organizations were pressured to conform to traditional 
ways of organizing within their fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This was particularly true in more 
‘institutional’ environments, such as education, where performance criteria were ‘nebulous’ or 
contested. There, organizations were rewarded for appearing legitimate, rather than for their superior 
technical performance (D’Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991). Much has changed since the advent of the 
New Institutionalism, both within the field of education (Meyer & Rowan, 2006), as well as the 
organizational literature (Scott, 2008). Within education, the emergence of choice initiatives, growth 
of private schools, homeschooling, and even for-profit educational enterprises, have greatly expanded 
the range of educational options. This challenges a primary postulate of the New Institutionalism 
(‘isomorphism’): that organizational populations converge on ‘taken-for-granted’ models. Further, 
since the 1970s, many public school jurisdictions have initiated accountability regimes aimed at 
boosting academic standards, prompting schools to alter their technical cores in response to external 
monitoring. This has challenged another New Institutional tenet (‘loose coupling’): that school 
structures are weakly associated with technical exigencies in their local surroundings.  
While scholars acknowledge the impacts of choice and accountability schemes on schools, 
they also note that norms in education are stubbornly durable. As highlighted earlier, schools typically 
remain isomorphic with peers, are driven by status-seeking and non-instrumental logics. To explain 
why such norms persist, even in market settings, we draw attention to the ‘embeddedness’ of 
education within broader societal structures. Among some parents, for example, education is 
associated with the development of children’s very personhood, and broad goals of cultivating, 
enriching, and preserving cultures, religions and languages (Falch & Mang, 2015). In addition, even in 
an era of heightened education competition, many traditional schooling structures and practices are 
valued for their perceived ‘prestige.’ Economists have noted that school selection, at both K-12 and 
university levels, is not very cost sensitive. Individuals will pay large fees for educational services if 
they are seen to have repute (Clotfelter, 1999). Elite private schools for instance, are able to command 
exorbitant fees (Baker, 2014; Khan, 2010). Conversely, cost-cutting in education is associated with 
cheapness and low-status (Clotfelter, 1999). Public schooling has also long been perceived by some 
stakeholders as a societal vehicle for equity, fairness, and equal opportunity. The latter is a narrative 
that drove the expansion of education throughout the 20th century (Schofer & Meyer, 2005). And, if 
                                                 
2 Within the organizational literature, loose coupling is defined as occurring in a variety of scenarios (see Weick, 
1976). For example, it is said to exist when i) organizational components (e.g. departments, office) operate in 
isolation, with little consistency in their norms or culture or  ii) organizational performance has little bearing on 
its survival. 
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anything, is a sentiment that has gained greater support throughout this period. At a societal level, 
there is an ever-greater concern that schooling ought to be an ‘equalizing’ force in an increasingly 
unequal society (e.g., Brennan & Naidoo, 2008; Murnane & Duncan, 2011). We posit that normative 
understandings of schooling such as these have two key consequences. First, they buffer schools in 
market settings from some of the technical and ‘rationalizing’ pressures that markets are said to 
generate, namely cost-efficiency and test score competition. Second, these norms can actively shape 
consumer demand in school markets. To the degree that conventional school forms are associated 
with prestige, that unconventional forms are distrusted, or that cost cutting is associated with 
‘cheapness’ and lesser quality, institutional norms can actually infuse market processes, becoming 
bases by which consumers seek schools, and serving as parameters by which schools compete.  
 
Theory II: Embedding Private Education in Communities 
 
The social embeddedness of markets is a foundational idea in Economic Sociology (Coleman, 
1988; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996).3 Exchanges and transactions do not occur in a social vacuum; 
rather, they germinate in social relationships. Strong norms of trust and reciprocity can ‘lubricate’ the 
extension of credit; while fear of opportunism, deceit and distrust can stifle economic interactions 
(Uzzi, 1996). Whereas traditional economic theory may be based on the ‘buyer beware’ premise, 
economic sociologists note that closely-tied market actors will apply social pressures of ‘shame’ to 
prevent malfeasance in markets (Grannovetter, 1985). In sum, economic sociologists emphasize that 
economic behavior in well-defined communities is not frequently guided by conventional factors like 
profit-seeking and economic self-interest (Coleman, 1988). This is a logic we believe can be fruitfully 
extended to the process of school selection, and the broader constitution of educational markets.  
It is widely accepted that private schools, for example, have longstanding ties to various 
communities that have perceived their needs to be un-met by the public school system. Religious 
groups, for instance, have long sponsored private schools, as evidenced by the lengthy history of 
Catholic schools in the USA. In Canada, one-half of the 2000 private schools have religious mandates 
(Allison, Hasan & Van Pelt, 2016). Our Toronto data show over one-quarter of the city’s 286 private 
schools have a religious orientation. The import of religious communities for Market Theory is that 
they generate demand for, and supplies of, private schools that, in their organization, routinely defy 
market logic. Religious schools are mostly non-profit bodies subsidized by religious groups. They 
prioritize moral education over forms of learning that can be captured by standardized test scores 
(Zine, 2008). Likewise, across a range of nations, Elite private schools have had strong ties to very 
different communities. Societal elites have typically sought schooling that can bring them status, 
prestige and exclusivity (Cookson & Persell, 1985; Khan, 2010; Meadmore & Meadmore, 2004; 
Maxwell & Maxwell, 1985). They often gravitate toward English-style boarding schools with 
architectural styles, dress codes and refined interactions that signal luxuriousness and affluence rather 
than technical performance. While over recent decades elite schools have pursued more robust 
academics and extra-curricular offerings, to be more socially relevant and educationally competitive, 
they have done so via lavish spending and the accumulation of large endowments, both of which 
have the effect of sheltering them from economizing pressures (Gatzimbide-Fernandez, 2009; Khan, 
2010). As such, while religious and elite private schools differ greatly along many dimensions, they 
share a sponsorship from a community. As a result, their structures often defy rationalizing forces 
that would be otherwise encouraged by market competition.  
 
                                                 
3 See Rivera, Soderstrom & Uzzi (2010) for a recent review of the embeddedness literature.  
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 25 No. 39 SPECIAL ISSUE 8 
 
Theory III: The Formation of Market Segments 
 
We argue that these linked communities and their corresponding norms combine to create 
market segments within education. Markets are not always openly competitive, with each actor being in 
direct competition with every other actor. Rather, they are ‘balkanized,’ splintering into distinct 
groupings of consumers and suppliers by taste, region, or demographics. Whereas classical economic 
theory portrays firms as subjected to uniform market pressures, along with cost-cutting and 
performance exigencies, distinct segments and communities can prompt the emergence and 
continued survival of institutional forms which are neither cost-effective nor efficient. Applying this 
thinking to education, we reason that any firm embedding of schools of choice across different 
communities can serve to fragment the educational marketplace, limiting the open competitive 
environment championed by choice advocates.  In private education, for instance, these segments will 
not be mere ‘wrinkles’ on the surface of otherwise uniform competitive spaces, but will instead signal 
deep differences among educational “consumers” and “suppliers” in terms of social networks, 
backgrounds, demographics and philosophies. Further, different community patrons will draw on 
diverging institutional norms, each refracting market pressures in different ways. For instance, well-
connected and affluent patrons can bring stability to a segment, buffering schools against excessive 
cost-cutting, while incentivizing the adoption of luxurious features, even those that may prove 
technically inefficient. In contrast, schools in segments that lack such community ties may need to 
have more technical orientations to survive. Thus, we hypothesize that segments form through 
different combinations of community ties and institutional norms, and imbue their organizations with 
distinct identities, mandates, and orientations. Schools compete for students mainly within their 
segment rather than across the entire market. 
 
Methods and Data 
Setting 
 
The TPS sector consists of four main market segments. First, there are “Elite” schools, which 
we define as members of the Council of Independent Schools (CIS), an exclusive governing body of 
private schools. Second, there are “Religious” schools comprised mainly of Christian, Jewish and 
Islamic schools. Third, there are “International” schools that recruit students from abroad, and have 
mandates to teach English and other languages as part of a preparation for North American 
universities. Finally, there is the “New Sector”, a segment with a vast array of curricular and 
pedagogical specialties and philosophies, like Montessori, Waldorf and feminism, specialties like 
science, arts and sports, and museum-focus schools. As a segment, these schools tend to resemble 
American charter schools. In many respects, the TPS sector has qualities idealized by Market Theory. 
It houses a great array of schools with varied philosophies, specialties, sizes, costs, and clientele. It is 
also minimally regulated by government. While the province of Ontario does require private schools 
to be accredited by its Ministry of Education, that process requires only that schools enroll at least 
five students, pass health and safety standards, and demonstrate that they roughly follow the outline 
of the provincial curriculum. Otherwise, Ontario private schools are free to organize themselves as 
they please. But, in return for that freedom, Ontario private schools do not receive any tuition 
subsidies from the public. Many are subsidized by religious and ethnic organizations, but charge 
tuition according to what the market will bear. 
 
Data Gathering 
 
Our data set contains information on all 286 private schools listed as accredited on the official 
Ontario Ministry of Education website in 2009 and 2013. We compiled a rich data set by combining 
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six data sources: the Ontario Ministry of Education, school websites, a private school directory, 
phone interviews, census data, and web-based visual resources. We gathered the majority of our data4 
on enrollment sizes and years that schools were initially established directly from the Ontario Ministry 
of Education. Some institutions failed to report those data to the Ministry, so to reduce missing data, 
we gathered publicly available information posted on school websites, and examined a local private 
school directory known as Our Kids. If those two steps also failed, we then called representatives from 
schools for an informational interview.  
We also examined and manually coded school websites to record a variety of organizational 
traits and practices. To examine the organizational stability of each segment, in the summer of 2015 
we accessed the official list of private schools accredited by the Ontario Ministry of Education. We 
recorded whether schools were ‘born’ over the five years between 2010 and 2015, whether they 
“died” (had closed), and whether they had their credential granting authority revoked5 by the Ministry. 
To examine whether schools complied with institutional conventions, we coded each school as a 
‘specialist’ or ‘generalist’ given their curriculum type and target population. We designated specialists 
to be those providing curriculums with an emphasis on the arts or ballet, for example, or servicing a 
particular niche such as high school athletes, or mentioned a type of pedagogy like “Montessori.” We 
also recorded whether or not they advertised their accreditation on their website or other promotional 
materials. To further examine their institutional traits, we used Google Streetview and Google Earth 
services to code whether schools were housed in conventional school buildings or in unconventional 
spaces, such as church basements, houses or shopping plazas. We also coded whether schools were 
located in traditional residential areas or non-traditional surroundings, like industrial and commercial 
areas. As an indicator of conformity to institutional norms, we also recorded whether or not schools 
advertised their accreditation by actors such as the Ministry of Education, or associations like the 
Ontario Federation of Independent Schools (OFIS). To examine status orientations, we coded 
promotional efforts to showcase prestigious placements in elite international post-secondary 
institutions, such as Harvard, Yale or Oxford. We further coded whether schools advertised 
prestigious curricula such as Advanced Placement (AP) and International Baccalaureate (IB 
Programs). To further examine status orientations, we gathered data on census tracts surrounding 
each school, including their average dwelling values and average family incomes from the 2011 
National Household Survey. Finally, we recorded the average tuition fees for each school by 
averaging the highest and lowest fees charged by it for yearly enrollments across different grades.6 
 
Analytic Approach 
 
Our study aims to detect the effects of market segments on the practices and structures of 
Toronto private schools. We test for significant differences between segments along three dimensions 
of school organization: stability, institutional versus technical orientation, and status orientation. This 
investigation proceeds in two stages. We first compare descriptive statistics for each segment for all 
                                                 
4 We acquired enrollment data for the 2010-2013 years, the only available Ministry data at the time of writing, 
and subsequently used the average of such figures in our analysis. 
5 The revocation of credential granting authority usually follows a failure to meet Ministry guidelines, as either 
discovered through inspection or demonstrated by parent complaints. 
6 Several of our variables have either no missing data or are missing only 5% or less of all cases. Variables with 
the most missing data are: school size (17% of all cases missing), tuition (25%), prestigious curricula (22%) and 
prestigious placement (12% missing). Many schools with missing data had closed and dropped out of the 
population after 2009, making it difficult to find data on tuition fees, for instance. Because these rates of 
missing data are not overly high, and since some of these variables are dichotomous, we elected to not attempt 
multiple imputation. 
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variables, and conduct difference of means/difference of proportions tests between Elite schools 
versus all others, and Religious schools versus the remaining two segments. Those tests reflect our 
reasoning that ties to distinctive communities – elites and religious groups – likely shape school 
characteristics. We then build multivariate models (OLS regression for continuous outcomes and 
logistic regression for binary outcomes) to test whether segment significantly predicts institutional 
and status orientations net of several control variables. Controls are important because experience 
and resources, not segment per se, may shape school structures and practices. Any school that 
survives selection pressures and avoids an organizational death will likely become stable and acquire a 
largesse of resources. To determine whether school orientations reflect their position in a segment, or 
are instead products of acquiring experience and resources, in the second stage we reconceive two of 
our key organizational variables – size and age – as control variables. The literature has shown that 
size and age can powerfully predict a host of organization traits (e.g., Scott & Davis, 2013). Moreover, 
population ecology research has shown these two variables to have strong consequences for 
organizational survival (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1983). We thus control for these two variables to 
untangle the effects of organizational size and age with those of segment, since segments likely differ 
along those variables.   
Our multivariate models also include three other control variables. First, we control for 
whether or not a school is at the elementary level only. Elementary and high-schools operate in 
different markets and have age-specific mandates, and so, for instance, it is doubtful that elementary 
schools will engage in practices like advertising the admission of their students into prestigious 
universities. Second, we control for whether or not a school had a website by the year 2015, using it 
as a proxy for a basic level of resources. Third, we controlled for whether or not a school had ever 
changed its name (7% of TPS schools had changed their name at least once). Since schools change 
their name for several reasons (e.g., new leadership, mandates, or locations) and since name changes 
can bring some instability to a school in any segment, we controlled for this practice. 
 
Findings 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 below compares the four segments by sample size, means, standard deviations, and t-
test results on all of our variables. Asterisks in the column for the Elite segment denotes whether or 
not means/proportions for the Elites differ significantly from all other segments combined; the 
column for the Religious segment denotes whether it differs from the New Sector and International 
segments combined. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Market Segment 
 All Segments 
(n=286) 
Elite  
(n=21) 
Religious 
(n=72) 
New Sector 
(n=145) 
International 
(n=48) 
Organization Stability     
School Age  
(n=270) 
25.8 (27.2) 74.8*** (55.8) 27.4** 
(21.1) 
19.5   (16.4) 19.5 (17.6) 
School Size  
(n=238) 
172.4 (234.6) 593*** (354.4) 213.8*** 
(249.5) 
91.2   
(111.7) 
112.2 (107.3) 
Recent Births  
(n=270) 
.26 (.44) 0.0** .15** (.36) .33 (.47) .30 (.47) 
Recent Deaths .15 (.36) 0.0* .15 (.36) .16  (.37) .21 (.41) 
Revoked Status .04 (.20) 0.0 .03 (.16) .06  (.23) .04 (.20) 
Institutional vs Technical Orientation    
Traditional Area .46 (.50) .86*** (.36) .46 (.50) .43 (.50) .38 (.49) 
Traditional Bldg .18 ( .39) .90*** (.30) .22** (.42) .09 (.29) .08 (.28) 
Advertise 
Accreditation 
(n=241) 
.51 ( .50) .95*** (.22)  .24*** (.43) .48 (.50) .76 (.43) 
Specialist Name 
(n=271) 
.28 (.45) .14 (.36) .06*** (.24) .31 (.46) .60 (.49) 
Specialist Curricula 
(n=154) 
.31 (.46) .24 (.44) .13** (.34) .43 (.50) .23 ( .43) 
Status Orientation      
Tuition (n=214) 6272 (4204) 12812***   
(3199) 
4181**  
( 3211)   
6095(3983) 5423 (2389) 
Income in area 
(n=280) 
127105    
(82788) 
253584*** 
(155046) 
110376 
(55988) 
123750    
(72276) 
105360    
(46022) 
Land Value (n=282) 602138  
(315627) 
1072140***   
(486358) 
571258 
(291727) 
578837    
(268208) 
509520      
(204112) 
Pop Density of Area 
(n=284) 
6132 (6757) 4236 (3575) 4465**  
(3332) 
6853 
(73256) 
7265 (8999) 
Prestigious 
Curriculum  
(n=224) 
.15 (.36) .67*** (.48) .09 (.29) .10  (.30) .08 (.27) 
Prestigious 
Placement 
(n=253) 
.21 (.41) .62*** (.50) .03*** (.18) .16 (.37) .41 (.50) 
Controls      
Elementary only 
(n=271) 
.38 (.49) .33 (.48) .57*** (.50) .38 (.49) .12 (.32) 
Has Website  .76 (.43) 1.0** (0.0) .68 (.47) .77 (.42) .75 (.44) 
Name Change .07 (.25) 0.0 (0.0) .07 (.26) .08 (.28) .04 (.20) 
*** denotes p<.001, ** denotes p<.01, * denotes p<.05 
Note: Statistics in each cell are means or proportions with standard deviation in parentheses. Asterisks are derived from 
T-tests, which for the Elite segment compare means/proportions to all other segments combined; tests for the Religious 
segment compare to New Sector and International segments combined. Sample sizes for variables with some missing 
data are noted in the first column. 
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Table 1 shows that the Elite segment is by far the most stable. The first panel shows that Elite 
schools on average are considerably older and larger, and have the fewest births, deaths, and 
revocation of their credit-granting status. Indeed, the Elites were the lone segment to not have any 
organizational births, deaths, or revocations over the previous five years. Religious schools form the 
next most stable segment. Compared to the New Sector and International segments, religious schools 
are significantly older and larger. Also, the Religious segment has significantly fewer births than the 
New Sector and International segments, while having similar numbers of deaths and revocations. In 
general, schools in the New Sector and International segments tend to be the smallest, youngest and 
least stable, though not all differences are statistically significant. 
Next, do segments differ in their institutional orientation? Are some more likely to follow 
standard conventions in education, and are others more technically-driven? The second panel of 
Table 1 shows that the Elite schools are by far the most ‘institutional.’ Almost all Elite schools are 
housed in traditional school buildings and located in traditional residential areas, and almost all 
advertise their accreditation. But, while most of the Elite segment embraces generalist curricula, a 
substantial minority of schools has specialist names and curricula (14% and 26% respectively), and 
thus, the Elite segment as a whole is not significantly less likely to seek niches than the other 
segments. This pattern suggests that compared to other segments, the Elite is quite institutional. 
Nonetheless, it operates in a market environment and thus needs to engage in many technical 
practices such as developing niche specialties. Thus, Market Theory has a strong kernel of empirical 
power, correctly predicting that even the most institutional segments of the market are affected by 
technical forces. But, we also emphasize that the market as a whole appears to have not homogenized 
into a series of openly competing niches, but instead has coalesced into a broader set of segments that 
serve to limit the scope of competition. 
The Religious segment also has a mix of institutional orientations, though its mix is distinct. 
The second panel of Table 1 shows that Religious schools are significantly more likely to be housed in 
traditional school buildings than are New Sector and International schools, though only 22% of 
religious schools are in such spaces, again illustrating the pervasive power of technical forces in the 
marketplace. Most religious schools need to economize and locate in alternative kinds of buildings. 
Yet, in terms of pedagogy and curricula, almost no Religious schools adopt non-religious specialty 
names or curricula. Instead, they present themselves by their religious orientations, and do not 
attempt to compete on other grounds. And, only one quarter of Religious schools advertise 
accreditation with a professional body, making it the least likely segment to do so. We interpret this 
tendency as a signal that these schools have a stronger affiliation with their religious communities 
rather than with other educational bodies. 
New Sector and International schools are in many respects the most technically-oriented. 
Table 1 shows that only 8% and 9% of New Sector and International schools are housed in 
traditional school buildings. This eschewing of physical conventions in the field may be a product of 
their lesser stability and their need to economize. Further, those two segments are the likeliest to have 
specialist names and curricula. In the New Sector, 31% and 45% of schools have specialist names and 
curricula, approximately double the proportion in the Elite segment, and much greater than the 
proportion for the Religious segment. Similarly, 60% of International schools have specialist names, 
which is double the proportion of any other segment. Yet, in others respects these segments have 
institutional orientations. About one-half and three-quarter of New Sector and International schools 
respectively advertise their accreditation, figures that are far lower than those for the Elite segment, 
but are significantly greater than those for the Religious segment. The International and New Sector 
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segments have a mix of orientations, being clearly technically driven on the one hand, yet also 
embracing some institutional norms.  
The next panel of Table 1 examines the status orientations of schools. It shows that the Elite 
segment is by far the most status oriented. Elite schools charge by far the highest tuition fees, more 
than double those of any other segment. Their immediate locales also have the highest income 
earners and larger land values; again, both figures are approximately double the values for any other 
segment. And, the Elite schools are by far the likeliest to adopt prestigious curricula like AP and IB 
courses and advertise placing their graduates in prestigious universities. Roughly two-thirds of Elite 
schools engage in these status-oriented practices. In contrast, no more than 10% of schools in any 
other segment adopt prestigious curricula, and few advertise prestigious placement (their closest rival 
is the International segment, where 40% of schools advertise prestigious placement). Overall, the 
Elite segment is the likeliest to engage in status-oriented practices. 
In contrast, the Religious segment is the least status oriented. Despite being older, larger, and 
having fewer recent births than New Sector and International schools, the Religious segment charges 
the lowest tuition fees and is the least likely to advertise prestigious placement (only 3% of Religious 
schools do so). We interpret this lack of status orientation to be a product of its faith-based mandate 
and community ties. The other segments have a mix of status orientations. While the New Sector, 
International and Religious segments differ little in their physical locales and low rates of adopting 
prestigious curricula, they differ in their advertising prestigious placement (as mentioned above, a 
significant plurality of International schools advertise). 
Taken as a whole, these descriptive comparisons suggest that the Elite segment is the most 
stable and status oriented, and has a mix of institutional orientations. The Religious segment is also 
relatively stable, yet has the weakest status orientations and a mix of institutional orientations.  New 
Sector and International segments are the least stable, and have complex mixes of conventional 
institutional traits and status orientations. 
 
Multivariate Analyses 
 
Table 2 displays regression coefficients for a series of logit and OLS regression models that 
predict a variety of organizational traits. The Table displays coefficients for each segment that control 
for school age, size, elementary level, whether a school had ever changed its name, and whether it had 
a website in 2015. 
 
Table 2   
Regression Coefficients for Models of Organizational Traits 
Outcome Elite  Religious  New Sector R2 and N 
     
Institution vs 
Technical 
Orientation 
    
Traditional Area  .074 (.846) -.561 (.496) -.044 (.435) .18 (n=226) 
Traditional Building  3.18 (.988)***  .584 (.676)  .021 (.643) .31 (n=226) 
Advertise 
Accreditation 
 2.73 (1.31)* -1.81 (.594)** -.983 (.523)* .21 (n=202) 
Specialist Name -2.67 (.579)*** -3.85 (.703)*** -1.82 (.447)*** .21 (n=220) 
Specialist Curricula   .128 (.869) -.916 (.800) .818 (.586) .12 (n=141) 
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Status Orientation     
Tuition 5516 (1244)*** -1407(940) 1331 (784)* .36 (n=180) 
Income in area 86278(26068)*** -6932 (17562) 25467 (15445)* .27 (n=221) 
Land Value 380433 (97243)*** 44671 (65126) 111798 (57558)* .26 (n=223) 
Pop Density of Area  -1500 (2038) -797(1362) 1989(1200)* .06 (n=224) 
Prestigious 
Curriculum 
1.85 (.910)* -.191 (.822) .470 (.730) .27 (n=191) 
Prestigious Placement .939 (.833) -2.77 (.911)*** -.690 (.476) .25 (n=210) 
*** denotes 1 tailed p<.001, ** denotes p<.01, * denotes p<.05 
Note: All models control for school size, age, whether or not a school is elementary only, whether it had a website by 
2015, and whether it had ever changed its name. Statistics in each cell are either logit coefficients or regression 
coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).  
 
Our models suggest that the Elite sector is the most institutional segment. Even after 
controlling for organizational age and size, Elite schools are the most likely to operate in traditional 
school buildings, are most likely to advertise their accreditation and are likeliest to have a generalist 
name. Further, the Elite segment has the strongest status orientations, charging high tuition, locating 
their physical plants in expensive settings, and adopting prestigious curricula. Thus, these models 
suggest that the practices of Elite schools are not mere byproducts of their stability and resources; 
instead, their practices also reflect conventions and expectations that predominate in that segment.   
The other segments, however, have more mixed orientations. The Religious segment, for 
instance, eschews some status orientations, being less likely than other segments to advertise 
prestigious placements, even controlling for age and size. Religious schools also avoid advertising 
accreditation with a professional body, yet also avoid specialist (non-religious) names. Likewise, the 
New Sector appears to bear the imprint of technical forces even after controlling for age and size 
(those schools are significantly younger and smaller than are Elite and Religious schools). The New 
Sector is significantly less likely to advertise accreditation and is more likely to have a specialist name. 
Yet, that segment does embrace a status orientation, at least compared to International schools, the 
reference category: the New Sector charges relatively high tuition, and tends to locate in relatively 
high income, affluent areas. We interpret this pattern of coefficients as suggesting that the New 
Sector is a more technically-oriented version of the Elites: it needs to embraces specialty niches and 
economizing practices where necessary, but also adopts some status orientations. In a sense, these 
schools may be organizational upstarts: younger, smaller and more precarious versions of the Elite. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion: The Social Foundations of School Markets 
 
Market theory offers a fundamental basis for understanding private schools. In our study, 
even the most institutional regions of the marketplace - those inhabited by Elite and Religious schools 
- responded readily to technical pressures, whether by seeking pedagogical niches or locating in non-
traditional buildings. But our framework provides an alternative account for understanding key 
variations in the effects of markets on school organizations. To understand those variations, we blend 
ideas from New Institutionalism and Economic Sociology, and recognize private schools as shaped 
not only by dictates of open market competition, but also by institutional norms and communities. 
Rather than seeing markets as unleashing generic competitive forces that continually erode 
institutional norms, we contend that those forces coalesce into a series of segments, each connected 
to a specific community or network, and each infused by different institutional norms. This process 
fragments the market, encouraging different schools to adopt very different organizational identities, 
mandates and goals. To test these ideas, we compared organizational structures and practices across 
The effects of market segments on Toronto private schools  15 
 
four market segments, and found them to have significantly different structures and practices, even 
after controlling for school age and size. Elite schools are very stable, embedded in networks of 
affluent families, and responsive to a unique combination of institutional conventions and status-
orientations. Religious schools, in contrast, connect to various faith communities and are oriented 
towards moral education, not status. International schools are less stable, but being embedded in 
loose immigrant recruitment networks in other countries, they also adopt a unique mix of 
institutional, technical and status orientations. Likewise, the New Sector has its own mix of 
institutional, technical and status orientations. In some respects, our findings simply reflect a market 
in which a variety of suppliers get matched to clients with varied tastes and preferences. But taken as 
a whole, our broad pattern of findings suggests that market competition does not impose a uniform 
set of technical practices among all private schools. Due to the social embeddedness of school 
markets, private schools do not compete for clients in social vacuums, but are also shaped by 
communities and their differing institutional norms.  
Indeed, our study leads us to think differently about the dynamics of school choice.  
Competitive forces can indeed have the power to undercut communities and institutional norms in 
education, but the reverse occurs as well: communities and norms become key bases for the 
formation of educational market segments. This explains why Toronto private schools, despite 
operating in a highly competitive market, do not invariably economize, seek niches and drop 
longstanding institutional conventions. Rather, their actions vary strongly by segment. Elites’ social 
connections allow them to generate large endowments, which in turn shelters them from many 
technical forces and gives them a stability by which they engage in many luxurious practices. Schools 
in other segments must economize more, but they do so in diverging ways, reflecting the unique 
wants of their communities, whether animated by faith, norms of intensive childrearing, or wants of 
acculturation and language training. In sum, this recognition of the dynamic interplay between market 
forces, communities and institutional norms can provide a fuller understanding of neoliberal reforms 
in education. We believe that both opponents and proponents of those reforms tend to overstate 
their potential to transform school organizations. Market pressures certainly impact schools, but 
those effects are strongly mediated by social structures and norms. 
We recommend two future directions for research on the effects of markets on schools. First, 
researchers should conduct longitudinal studies of entire populations of schools of choice, with an 
eye to their distinct paths and trajectories. For instance, the Elite segment continues to be embedded 
in a community that has historically sought exclusivity and prestige in education (Cookson & Persell, 
2008; DiMaggio, 1982). Many Elite schools have long resembled English boarding schools, adopting 
their architectural styles, dress codes, and other organizational traits that have been associated with 
status and cultural refinement (Khan, 2011; Maxwell & Maxwell, 1985; Meadmore & Meadmore, 
2004). But in recent decades, their academic and extra-curricular programs have become more robust, 
aimed at making their graduates increasingly competitive in elite university admissions (Baker, 2014; 
Khan, 2011). Thus, the Elite segment is increasingly mixing it historic signals of prestige with newer 
symbols of competitiveness.  
The trajectory of the Religious segment may also be changing in North America. Those 
schools have long been composed of Jewish and Christian schools, and connected to churches, 
synagogues and temples that have provided direct support (e.g. funding, buildings) and a steady 
stream of clients. But the composition of this segment is changing in response to shifting 
demographics, at least in Toronto. In tables not shown, we found that the Christian branch of this 
segment is shrinking, suffering some organizational deaths without any new births. The Jewish branch 
in this segment is more stable. But Toronto’s Islamic branch is growing, providing the bulk of newly 
opened Religious schools, while being less stable than Christian and Jewish schools. Toronto Islamic 
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schools are significantly younger, smaller, charge the lowest tuition fees, are likelier to have had their 
accreditation revoked, and operate outside of traditional and affluent areas, and without traditional 
physical plants. But these schools may soon change. They may be currently in a start-phase, now 
operating in “make-shift” manner, but over time, they may stabilize and adopt organizational traits 
that converge with those of Jewish and Christian schools.   
While lacking the well-bounded communities of the Elite and Religious private schools, 
Toronto International schools are nevertheless connected to a kind of community, albeit one that is 
far looser and more dispersed. The “community” for International schools consists of a series of 
networks of recruiters of foreign students from Southeast Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
This loosely-bounded, diffuse social grouping encourages International schools to adopt some unique 
practices, such as offering language programs and acculturation functions such as tourist-styled field 
trips. Further, their survival is contingent on federal immigration policies that bring shifting numbers 
of clients year to year, and on foreign demand to enter North American universities. As universities in 
Asia, in particular, gain status and prestige, the market for international students wanting a North 
American education may shrink over time. Similarly, the community that fuels the New Sector is also 
diffuse and only loosely connected, united mainly by their  intensive parenting styles and middle class 
notions of children’s intellectual and emotional development (see Lareau, 2010; Stevens, 2001; 
Wrigley, 1989). These norms generate a demand for learning environments that are increasingly 
individualized and nurturing (Aurini & Davies, 2004; Davies & Aurini, 2004; Urwin & Sharland, 
1992), giving rise to the New Sector over the past 25 years, populated by Toronto’s youngest, smallest 
and least stable private schools. Since the Elite segment is very stable and largely impenetrable to 
newer schools, this segment may continue to grow if more and more ‘intensive’ parents seek private 
schooling.  Our point here is that different segments of the private school market are likely to each 
take distinct trajectories in the coming decades. 
A second avenue for future research would be to extend our framework to other settings.  
For instance, school markets in many U.S. cities consist of public schools, charter schools and 
Catholic schools. But unlike Toronto, race in those settings is a stronger driver of school choice, 
more so than religion and immigration. Also, unlike Toronto’s private school sector, those settings 
are less purely marketized; most U.S. schools of choice receive public funds and are regulated by state 
bodies. Nonetheless, their organizational traits may also be shaped by unique combinations of 
community ties and institutional norms. American research has found surprising levels of 
isomorphism among schools of choice (e.g., Lubienski, 2003; Lubienski & Lee, 2016), likely signaling 
the pervasiveness of strong institutional norms in American schooling. We look forward to other 
detailed studies from other jurisdictions that are mindful of ways that the social embeddedness of 
schools of choice can mediate market forces. 
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